EU-NATO relations : a long-term perspective by Biscop, Sven
 85 Nação e Defesa
EU-NATO Relat ions :  
A Long-Term Perspect ive
2018
N.º 150
pp. 85-93
Abstract 
EU-NATO relations have long amounted to a 
beauty contest. In reality, the EU and NATO are 
very different organisations: the former is an actor, 
the latter is an instrument. Taking this into account, 
and leaving behind the often emotional and ideo-
logical debates, an effective division of labour can 
be designed for the three key functions of security 
and defence: strategy, operations, and capabilities. 
The result can be a European pillar of the European 
allies and partners of NATO – which also make up 
the EU – that contributes to collective defence 
while achieving strategic autonomy for expedition-
ary operations. The questions remains whether 
such a pillar should eventually also seek strategic 
autonomy in territorial defence. Eventually, a new 
NATO could emerge: a US-EU alliance.
Resumo
As Relações UE-NATO: Uma Perspetiva de Longo-
Prazo
O artigo analisa as relações entre a UE-NATO na pers-
petiva do que as diferencia, considerando a primeira 
como um actor e a segunda como um instrumento. Par-
tindo desta base analítica, rejeitando os debates emocio-
nais e ideológicos, o autor considera que uma divisão 
eficaz do trabalho estratégico pode ser equacionada em 
três funções centrais nos domínios da segurança e defesa: 
estratégia, operações e capacidades. O resultado poderá 
ser o do desenvolvimento de um pilar europeu dos alia-
dos europeus e dos parceiros NATO – que também inte-
gram a UE – que contribua para a defesa colectiva e ao 
mesmo tempo que assegure a autonomia estratégica na 
vertente expedicionária. A questão mantém-se se tal 
pilar deve ou não alcançar a autonomia estratégica euro-
peia no que respeita à defesa territorial. Eventualmente 
uma nova NATO poderá emergir sob a forma de uma 
aliança entre os EUA e a União Europeia.
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Introduction
If one could start from a blank page, one would not create two separate organisa-
tions, the EU and NATO, but assemble European cooperation on all dimensions of 
foreign, security and defence policy under one roof. But we cannot. Europeans 
organize their collective territorial defence in NATO, which can also deploy expe-
ditionary operations of any type anywhere in the world. The EU as well, through 
its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), can deploy all types of expedi-
tionary operations across the globe. When a crisis demands a military response, the 
question thus inevitably arises under which flag Europeans will act. Neither NATO 
nor the EU have armed forces of their own, so they must appeal to the same pool of 
capabilities for any operation. 
A Beauty Contest 
As a result, a beauty contest has arisen between both organisations, which have 
almost come to see deployments as a market. Both absolutely want to maintain 
their market share and their consequent claim to their members’ military capabi- 
lities. 
For example, there was great frustration in NATO headquarters in Brussels when 
after the November 2015 terrorist attacks, France invoked Article 42.7 of the EU 
Treaty rather than NATO’s Article 5. This was read as a direct threat against what 
NATO considers to be its exclusive market: the security of our own territory. Many 
in NATO also felt overshadowed by the EU’s maritime operations, notably against 
Somali piracy. When the EU launched Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean, 
NATO perceived a new market and quickly followed up with its own operation in 
the Aegean Sea, between Greece and Turkey. This operation could not have been 
done under the EU flag, for that would have been unacceptable to Turkey, a member 
of NATO but not of the EU and highly critical of the EU’s defence dimension. This 
shows that the beauty contest is totally meaningless. Europeans cannot but assess 
on a case-by-case basis under which flag they can operate most effectively. 
The EU for its part often feels marginalized, because when its Member States decide 
to launch combat operations they seldom, if ever, consider the CSDP as a frame-
work. It goes further than that though: in fact states prefer to pass NATO by as well. 
The states that decide on combat operations prefer to conduct them themselves 
(such as the French in Mali) or through an ad hoc coalition outside the EU and 
NATO (such as the coalition against ISIL), so they can retain maximal control. 
Under the EU and NATO flag we patrol the seas, we train partner countries’ forces, 
and we preposition forces in Eastern Europe. But if there is any chance of combat, 
it appears that states prefer not to use either organisation – which makes the compe-
tition between them even more absurd. 
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Apples and Pears 
In order to put a stop to this meaningless competition, one must understand the 
nature of both organisations and how their tasks relate to each other. During the 
long years of the Cold War, NATO acquired such centrality in European foreign and 
defence policy, and in Europe’s relations with the US, that many cannot, or do not 
want, to see that this centrality has long since come to an end. Topping the agenda 
of Europe’s foreign policy no longer is the threat of invasion, but climate change, 
energy dependence, international trade, terrorism, the rise of China, etc.: issues on 
which NATO has little to contribute. On these issues, the EU mostly interacts 
directly with the US, outside the NATO framework. 
The EU and NATO cannot be compared, in fact. The EU is a supranational organi- 
sation in which states share sovereignty. No EU Member State has abandoned any 
sovereignty, but on many issues Member States can only decide collectively, and by 
majority. This makes the EU a unique type of actor, something in between a state 
and an organisation. NATO on the contrary is an entirely intergovernmental organ-
isation, where all decisions are taken by consensus, and there is no question of 
pooling sovereignty. In the EU this intergovernmental system applies only to 
foreign, security and defence policy: in these domains European integration has 
advanced the least and the EU too for the time being operates in an intergovern-
mental way. In general, however, the political centre of gravity of the EU lies in 
between Brussels and the national capitals, whereas in NATO it clearly is in the 
capitals (and in one capital in particular: Washington). 
Consequently, the EU is an actor, whereas NATO is an instrument. The states 
remain the most important actors, of course. Each state wages a foreign policy and 
defines a strategy to that end. Through the EU, the EU Member States in addition 
also pursue a collective foreign policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP, into which the CSDP is integrated), for which in 2016 they have defined a 
collective strategy, the Global Strategy. If in a given case EU strategy requires mili-
tary intervention, the Europeans have several options. A military operation can be 
conducted by the EU itself (through the CSDP), but also by NATO (which can thus 
be an instrument of EU strategy), by European forces under UN command, or by an 
ad hoc coalition of Member States (and non-members). It can even be a national 
operation, conducted by one Member State with the logistic and other support of 
fellow members. 
NATO does not wage its own foreign policy and therefore does not determine 
European strategy: EU strategy sets the context within which NATO operates, not 
the other way around. The only exception is collective territorial defence under 
Article 5, because for now the EU does not really play a role in this field. Hence for 
collective defence, and for that only, NATO is the forum where Europeans and 
Americans together decide on strategy. For all other issues, Europeans set strategy 
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through the EU, and Americans have their own US strategy. Many still think the 
opposite holds true, however, as if NATO in all areas determines the strategy within 
which Europeans, including the EU, must then act. 
The Ukraine crisis can easily demonstrate that this latter interpretation is faulty. 
NATO conducts the military response to the crisis: prepositioning forces on our 
eastern borders, as a message to Russia and to our own public opinion. That 
response takes place within the framework of an overall vision on the future of 
Europe’s relations with Russia, in all areas, including energy for example. This 
vision is not crafted in NATO. Europeans decide on this collectively in the EU, 
starting from their interests and priorities as Russia’s neighbour, while the Ameri-
cans develop their own views in Washington. The combination of those European 
and American visions then determines the margin within which the military instru-
ment is put to use, via NATO. 
Apparently it remains difficult to accept this new reality. Many refuse to see that in 
today’s multipolar world European and American interests and priorities are too 
divergent to pretend there can be a single NATO view of the world. Moreover, in 
US strategy China and Asia is now priority number one, no longer Europe, hence 
the US (rightly) expects Europeans themselves to ensure the stability of Europe’s 
periphery. So whether they act under the NATO flag or the EU flag: it will in any 
case have to be European states that take the initiative to resolve crises around 
Europe – the US will no longer automatically do that in its stead. At a stroke, this 
new American position renders EU-NATO competition entirely obsolete. 
In such a context, the EU must be an autonomous strategic actor. This implies that 
NATO operates within a strategic framework that is determined by the US on the one 
hand, and by the EU on the other hand. And that NATO can be the instrument of an 
exclusively European or even EU strategy, if in a specific contingency only Europeans 
want to act and use the NATO command structure to that end. On the other hand, 
this also implies that the EU must stop debating EU strategy as if the implementation 
of its military aspects is undertaken entirely through the CSDP, while the reality is 
that the majority of military operations take place in other frameworks. 
Division of Labour 
In order to optimise EU-NATO relations and, at the same time, achieve the strategic 
autonomy that the EU absolutely needs, one must address the three main functions 
of security and defence policy. Leaving all dogmas and emotions behind, rational 
analysis can determine how to organize them most effectively. 
Strategy 
First comes the strategic function. In this area things are clear-cut: the European 
states wage a foreign policy through the EU and to that end define a grand strategy 
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that integrates diplomacy, defence, trade, and aid. Only in the specific area of 
collective defence do the individual European states enter directly into a dialogue 
with the US and are the strategy and the military plans crafted in NATO. When a 
security problem arises in the periphery of Europe that may require a military 
response, i.e. in all non-Article 5 scenarios, it is through the EU as well that the 
Europeans states should assess the situation, in view of their values, interests 
and priorities as codified in the Global Strategy, in order to decide which action 
to take. In doing so, they have to take into account their overall foreign policy 
towards all states concerned, a foreign policy which in any case they wage through 
the EU. 
Operations 
Second, there is the operational function. There is no doubt who will have to launch 
future operations: increasingly, that will have to be the Europeans. Possibly with 
specific US support in well-defined areas (such as intelligence, special forces, and 
transport) as long as Europe itself does not possess all the required strategic 
enablers. But the condition for US support will be that the Europeans themselves 
take the initiative – if we don’t act to resolve crises in our own backyard the US is 
not going to either. Under which command Europeans will then deploy cannot be 
defined beforehand. It can only be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on 
the scale of operations and which command and control structure they require, on 
which countries want to participate, and on which flag is politically acceptable in 
the country where we have to deploy and which is not. There’s no harm therefore 
in maintaining various options: the CSDP, NATO, the UN, a temporary coalition, or 
a national operation by a single state. 
A contentious issue is whether the EU needs its own military headquarters. True 
strategic autonomy implies that one possesses all the means that one needs to act, 
without being dependent on the means of other actors. That includes the opera-
tional headquarters required to plan and conduct military operations up to the 
scale of the EU’s Headline Goal (50 to 60,000 troops). Today only NATO is capable 
of that. In addition, some individual countries have national operational headquar-
ters that can conduct operations of some scale, and which can be made available to 
the EU on a case-by-case basis: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom. The EU as such has within its structures but a small cell of just over 30 
officers: the Military Planning and Conduct Capacity (MPCC). This is to conduct 
only non-executive missions, such as capacity-building and training. Many EU offi-
cials have declared that in term the MPCC can grow into a real headquarters, but 
for now it is very far from that. Hence, when in a crisis Europeans decide to deploy 
troops under the EU flag they must sub-contract command and control, either to 
one of the five national headquarters, or to NATO. 
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This is what the discussion is about: how certain can one be that one of those head-
quarters will always be available if and when Europeans want to launch an opera-
tion? The five national headquarters are not automatically geared to conducting 
multinational operations. Staff officers from all Member States must be trained in 
all five, year after year, which is a costly affair. As regards the various NATO head-
quarters, the EU in principle has a guaranteed access, thanks to the 2002 Berlin Plus 
agreement. In practice, however, NATO decides on a case-by-case basis, hence 
many fear that a non-EU NATO Ally could veto the EU’s access. This is not a hypo-
thetical scenario. When in 2011 the British and the French had convinced the Amer-
icans to support the intervention in Libya, the US demanded that this would be a 
NATO operation. France, which had wanted to make this an EU operation, had to 
accept, only for Turkey then to state that it could not accept a NATO operation in 
that area. Washington then had to lean heavily on Ankara before NATO could 
finally assume command of the operation, which by then had already been going 
on for several days. The US itself is unlikely to refuse access to NATO command 
and control, for it wants Europe to assume more responsibility. But Washington 
will of course have a lot of influence on those operations, because American officers 
occupy most key posts in NATO headquarters. 
There are but two possible solutions. The EU could create a fully-fledged opera-
tional headquarters. In a way that is a duplication of NATO, which is why the UK 
has always blocked this option, but it’s not necessarily an unnecessary one. As seen 
above, it is useful to be able to operate under more than one flag, since one can 
never know the exact circumstances of any contingency beforehand. The EU could 
use this opportunity to construct a unique civil-military operational headquarters, 
integrating all dimensions of crisis management. The other option is to give the EU 
direct access to the NATO command structure. The Libyan air campaign, for 
example, was run by the NATO headquarters in Naples. If the EU has recourse to 
the NATO command structure according to the Berlin Plus agreement, it does not 
enter into communication with a headquarters like Naples, but with SHAPE, which 
passes on EU directives to the headquarters conducting the operation. As a result, 
the EU has but little control of its own operation. One could however grant the EU 
direct access to a headquarters like Naples, so that the headquarters is much closer 
to the political decision-making. 
Capabilities 
The third and final function is capabilities: the decision which different capabilities 
in army, navy and air force, in which quantities, are required. NATO has construed 
an elaborate mechanism, the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), which 
defines precise capability objectives for each Ally and closely monitors perfor-
mance. The Alliance defines a level of ambition for NATO as a whole, for all Allies 
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including the US, for Article 5 (collective territorial defence) and non-Article 5 
(expeditionary operations). That level of ambition is naturally higher than that of 
the EU-countries alone, which moreover includes only expeditionary operations, 
not territorial defence. What the NDPP cannot guarantee, however, is that the 
group of just the European NATO Allies (and partners) can act alone if necessary. 
NATO only looks at two levels: NATO as a whole and each Ally separately. One 
objective, for example, is for NATO as a whole to have sufficient strategic enablers, 
but the system is not built to ensure that those enablers are spread around the Alli-
ance, and so they are not. Most strategic enablers are American capabilities. As a 
result, the sum total of the capabilities of all EU Member States that are members or 
partners of NATO does not suffice to allow that group of countries to mount opera-
tions by themselves, without US support. An additional cause is that no single 
European country can afford to acquire strategic enablers in numbers that matter. If 
the European Allies want strategic enablers, they will have to pool their means and 
acquire them collectively. 
In order to achieve strategic autonomy, the EU Member States should therefore first 
define their own military level of ambition: which operations do the EU countries 
always want to be able to launch, if necessary by themselves, without any support 
from the non-EU NATO Allies? Which capabilities, including strategic enablers, 
does that then require? 
That collective capability target of the EU countries could then be incorporated into 
the NDPP, so that NATO can elaborate a mix of capability targets at three levels 
instead of just two: for NATO as a whole, for the EU Member States that are 
members or partners of NATO as a group, and for each individual NATO Ally. The 
result should be that the EU Member States collectively hold a range of capabilities 
that allows them to contribute to collective territorial defence together with all 
NATO Allies, to contribute to expeditionary operations with all NATO Allies, but 
also to conduct certain expeditionary operations alone if necessary, in accordance 
with an EU-defined level of ambition. 
If the EU Member States were to integrate their armed forces ever more, through 
EU mechanisms such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a real Euro-
pean pillar will emerge, which can contribute to NATO operations together with 
the US and other non-EU Allies, but which could also mount operations alone – 
under the EU flag or the NATO flag, but relying on European capabilities only. 
In political terms, there really already are two pillars in NATO today, even though 
Allies like Canada and Turkey don’t like to hear it: the US and the EU, i.e. the 
two strategic actors within the Alliance. But the EU as such is not represented in 
NATO. There is a lot of consultation between the two organisations, at different 
levels, from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and EU High Representa- 
tive Federica Mogherini to the military staff and the civilian administration. The 
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atmosphere between both is better than ever, though that does not necessarily mean 
that a lot happens in terms of concrete cooperation – then the beauty contest kicks 
in again. Mogherini and Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, are 
also invited to NATO summits of heads of state and government. Yet fundamen-
tally the EU voice is not present in the Alliance. 
As the European pillar solidifies, it would only be logical for the EU Member States 
to speak with one voice in NATO. Even though the EU as such is not a member of 
NATO, nothing prevents the EU Member States from sitting together prior to 
NATO meetings and agree on a common position. This has always been a red line 
for the United Kingdom, but after ‘Brexit’ they will no longer be able to block this 
– if the remaining Member States would want to go that way. Constituting an EU 
block within NATO would be but a logical consequence of the progressive develop-
ment of the EU as a strategic actor. 
Conclusion: Towards an EU-US Alliance? 
One question has been left unanswered: should the autonomous EU level of ambi-
tion be limited to expeditionary operations? Or should Europeans ultimately also 
be capable of defending their own territory? Whatever the answer, Europeans do 
have to reinforce all of their capabilities, for collective territorial defence as well as 
for expeditionary operations. The reason that today we don’t need to fear a direct 
invasion of our territory is not our own military strength but rather the military 
weakness of our potential opponents, especially Russia. And that we can count on 
the US, of course, thanks to NATO. 
But will the latter always be the case? President Donald Trump has made it appear 
as if those who have not contributed enough, should not count on the US anymore. 
The US did continue to increase the budget for its military presence in Europe. And 
yet it may not be unwise to start planning for the defence of Europe by Europeans 
alone, just in case. NATO could undertake such planning, or the EU, its European 
pillar. Not with the aim of abandoning the Alliance, but to ensure that there is a 
plan B, so that Europe is not entirely dependent on who happens to reside in the 
White House. For in that regard there are no more certainties. 
Perhaps Barry Posen’s (2014) idea is the best solution in the long term, because it is 
the most flexible: to replace NATO with a new alliance between the US and the EU 
as such (and other non-EU NATO allies could of course join this new format too). 
In such a constellation, the EU Member States would define an autonomous level of 
ambition for all military tasks, including territorial defence, and build an integrated 
set of forces to that end, but they would maintain an alliance with the US at the 
same time. Our capacity to deter or defeat any attack would still be underpinned by 
an obligation of mutual assistance between the EU and the US, but if it comes to the 
worst plans would be ready to defend ourselves alone. In this scenario, the various 
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NATO headquarters could be transferred to the EU, while the US could maintain 
liaison officers (just like today there are European liaison officers in the different 
American headquarters). All of these headquarters would be under the strategic 
control and political direction of the EU. Only the strategic headquarters, SHAPE, 
could remain a joint EU-US headquarters, alternating between a European and 
American commander (whereas today the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
SACEUR, always is an American). NATO would thus be Europeanised, as it were 
(Howorth, 2017). 
In an unpredictable world this does seem like a commendable option for the future. 
Furthermore this probably is what it takes to really generate an autonomous 
mind-set in Europe. Because after the end of the Cold War NATO just carried on, 
Europeans never really stopped looking to the US to know what to do. That’s our 
mistake, not theirs. In a balanced alliance, between the EU and the US, we could 
finally emancipate ourselves. 
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